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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
ITALIAN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Alessandro Roselli*
I shall divide my remarks into two sections: the first is de-
voted to a brief summary of the developments leading to greater
monetary and financial integration in Europe; the second deals
with the steps that have been taken in Italy, primarily at a legis-
lative and administrative level, to create a domestic framework
consistent with the new European environment.
Some of the steps that have been adopted and that are very
important to the process of European integration and the mod-
ernization of Italy's financial structures may appear belated or
of minor importance to a United States observer. However, one
should not forget the historic political and economic division of
Western Europe, the disparities and imbalances between its
economies, the different structures of its financial systems and,
therefore, the difficulties involved in moving toward a real over-
haul of intra-Europe relations.
What goes under the generic name of "Europe 1992" is a
process involving several components, some that have already
been realized in part. It can be summarized under three main
headings: (1) freedom of capital movements; (2) liberalization of
financial services; and (3) economic and monetary union.'
Concerning the freedom of capital movements, during the
late sixties and especially in the seventies, the deterioration of
the economic situation in several European countries led to the
imposition of a number of foreign exchange controls. The drive
toward freedom of capital movements started in Italy and in
other European Economic Community (Community) member
countries in the early eighties. This liberalization movement was
associated with a general improvement in the economic condi-
tions, a widespread decline in the inflation rate, the decrease in
oil prices, the gathering momentum of the financial innovation
that made such controls less effective, and a general political cli-
* United States Representative, Banca d'Italia and Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi.
1. I owe this tripartition, as well as several other comments, to Dr. Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, Deputy Director General of the Banca d'Italia. See Tommaso Padoa-Schi-
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mate that favored "deregulation."
Within this environment, in 1986 the Community's Single
European Act, in a strong revival of European cooperation,
channeled the liberalization process toward the broader goal of a
Single European Market which was to be achieved by the end of
1992. In the Single European Market, all physical, technical, and
fiscal barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital,
and persons will be abolished. For capital movements in particu-
lar, it was possible to speed up the process through Community
Directives that provided for the full liberalization of capital
within the Community after July 1, 1990. It is, however, unfor-
tunate that this goal has not been accompanied by a parallel
harmonization of the tax treatment of capital income within the
Community countries. Different tax structures and rates in dif-
ferent countries may create distortions in capital flows and gen-
erate instability. For instance, the withholding tax rate on bank
deposits in Italy is thirty percent, while in Luxembourg no with-
holding tax is charged on bank deposits.
Liberalization of financial services, and particularly banking
services, in a Single European Market also finds its roots in the
Single European Act of 1986. This liberalization is to be
achieved no later than January 1, 1993. Liberalization in this
sphere will be enacted with an important variation in the strat-
egy toward integration, on the basis of the principle of "mutual
recognition" of domestic regulations. Mutual recognition will
permit an institution licensed in one member country to operate
in any other member country without any further authorization,
so long as the institution complies with its home country rules.
In the banking field in particular, the Community's domestic
legislation will be harmonized to a bare minimum: the very defi-
nition of banking activities provided in the Second Directive2 is
quite broad. This means that even the most liberal national leg-
islation will fit into the Community definition; consequently,
banks belonging to countries with liberal legislation, operating in
other member countries that may have more restrictive legisla-
tion, will have a competitive advantage. This creates implicit
competition between national legal systems, and means, in turn,
a drive toward models of de-specialization, that is of diversified
banking/financial group, or universal bank. This strategy, based
2. Council Directive 89/646, published in EC Gazz. 386 (Dec. 30, 1989).
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on market forces working in a relatively deregulated environ-
ment, may be new for the United States, as the current debate
on the bank reform bill demonstrates, but is als6 innovative in
Europe. Its effects on a stability ground will be tested in the
field, but there is no question that it puts increasing burdens
and responsibilities on the supervisory authorities.
Concerning the economic and monetary union, the 1957
Treaty of Rome, which created the Community, paid limited at-
tention to monetary policy and exchange rates. At that time, an
environment of international monetary stability prevailed, cen-
tered upon the "gold-dollar standard." The idea of a European
monetary union was first put forward in the Werner Report of
1970. But the seventies were - as I noted previously - a troub-
led decade that included the breakdown of the fixed exchange
rate system, the oil crisis, and high monetary instability. In
those years, only a limited exchange rate agreement between the
German mark and some minor currencies was enacted, the so-
called "snake."
This "snake" was nonetheless the embryo of the European
Monetary System (EMS), which was created at the end of the
seventies. The EMS consists of a credit agreement among the
member states' central banks and an exchange rate mechanism
(ERM). The ERM requires each Community country to keep its
currency within a narrow margin against the other participating
currencies in the mechanism.'
The ERM has worked well, exercising a "discipline effect"
on the participating countries and leading them to a more posi-
tive and effective fight against inflation. However, two negative
factors have gradually emerged in connection with the greater
drive toward integration, particularly after the 1986 Single Euro-
pean Act. First, the EMS has worked asymmetrically: by making
disinflation the first policy priority, it gave a leading role to the
single country with the best performance in terms of price sta-
bility. This asymmetry is less acceptable when one thinks in
terms of a common or coordinated monetary policy among Com-
munity countries. Second, there exists a systemic instability or,
as we may say, an "inconsistency" in the combination of the fol-
lowing four factors: (1) full mobility of capital (which has al-
ready been enacted); (2) freedom of trade in goods and services
3. Plus or minus 2.25% of the respective central rate.
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(which will soon exist in the Community); (3) quasi-fixed ex-
change rates, as the EMS envisages; and (4) national autonomy
of their moneiary policies.
The ongoing process of economic and monetary union, how-
ever, goes well beyond the EMS and the Single European Mar-
ket. Economic and monetary union will ultimately result in a
single monetary policy, a new monetary institution, a single cur-
rency, and sound budgetary conditions in a framework of eco-
nomic convergence of the member countries. Based on the rec-
ommendations of the Delors Report of 19894 - produced by an
ad-hoc committee set up by the Community, consisting of the
Community central banks' governors and three experts - eco-
nomic and monetary union will be achieved in three stages.
Stage one is already underway and will be completed by the
end of 1993. In this phase, the Single European Market will be
implemented by the end of 1992. In addition, during this stage
an intergovernmental conference is working on amendments to
the Treaty of Rome that will establish the legal basis for the
economic and monetary union. These amendments are to be
signed by the end of 1991, and are to be ratified by the member
countries by the end of 1993.
Stage two - a transitional stage - will start in January,
1994. By the end of 1996, the date of passage to stage three is to
be set by the Community. The transitional stage should prepare
the framework for the final stage. To this end, two sets of condi-
tions will have to be met: a monetary one and an economic one.
The monetary set of conditions requires the creation of an
institution to coordinate national monetary policies, with the
goal of a single policy to be carried out by a European Central
Bank. This bank will be federally chartered, independent of na-
tional governments, accountable to Community institutions, and
aimed by statute at an overall price stability.
The economic set of conditions is based on the principle of
"convergence." The principle is accepted by the member coun-
tries, but the degree of convergence required is still in dispute.
The convergence indicators under discussion are primarily: (1)
currency stability; (2) rate of inflation; (3) budget policies; and
(4) current account of the balance of payments.




I shall now turn to my own country and consider Italy's po-
sition in the process of Community integration, focusing on the
three areas of integration I mentioned at the outset of my
remarks.
In January 1990 Italy decided to join the narrow band of
the EMS. Before that time, the Italian lira had a margin of fluc-
tuation of six percent, above or below the central rate, as per-
mitted by the ERM, mainly to take into account Italy's high in-
flation rate, approximately twenty percent, during the late
seventies and early eighties.
A few months later, in May 1990, the freedom of capital
movements was fully implemented in Italy, two months before
the Community deadline of July. The implementation was a his-
toric event for Italy, since different forms of foreign exchange
restrictions had been a constant feature since 1934.5 Although
the freedom of capital movements was enacted in Italy in com-
pliance with a Community Directive, its scope also includes
third countries, such as the United States. For anti-money-laun-
dering and tax-monitoring purposes, a limit on the use of cash in
foreign transactions has been maintained, while a reporting sys-
tem has been introduced for statistical reasons.
These two measures must be seen in the context of a strat-
egy, adopted by the Italian Central Bank, of stability oriented
monetary and foreign exchange policy, a strategy that has re-
sulted in a dramatic decrease in the inflation rate and a growth
rate during the eighties generally above the other Community
countries. This macroeconomic framework of financial stability
has to be complemented by strong budgetary measures in order
to reduce the excessive government deficit. This need is under-
lined by an inflation rate that, although substantially abated, is
still running at around six percent, and that remains above that
of our main European, and non-European, partners.
Concerning the liberalization of financial services, histori-
cally the Italian financial structure has - like the German one
and unlike that of Britain and possibly the United States -
been oriented more toward the banks than the market. Specifi-
cally, the role of the banks has been larger in financial interme-
diation than the role of the capital markets. Three pieces of leg-
5. Lamberto Dini, Director General of the Banca d'Italia, The Liberalization of Cap-
ital Movements in Italy: Constraints and Opportunities, Address at the Annual Meeting
of the Italian Association of Foreign Securities Dealers (June 2, 1990) at 4.
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islation recently enacted in Italy aim, on the whole, at
modernizing the banks' structure, at giving new strength to the
capital market and therefore at a more balanced structure of the
financial intermediation.
The first law, the "Amato-Carli law" of July 1990, 7 has
three key provisions: (1) the reorganization of public-law banks
and savings banks as joint-stock companies; (2) tax incentives
for bank mergers; and (3) the establishment of appropriate regu-
lations for banking groups. The goals of this law should be
viewed in light of the fact that the Italian banking industry has
long been characterized by a very large number of banks and few
big financial institutions, which are mostly government owned.
The legal structure of the public-law banks has often been that
of a foundation, or a charity organization; such structures are
not consistent with an internationally integrated credit market.
The Amato-Carli law will permit the incorporation of banks
as joint-stock companies, thereby enabling them to raise more
capital from the public by offering shares. In turn, this will in-
crease the private component of the banks' equity capital. The
law also offers creditors greater disclosure about the banks, and
generally creates a legal form that is common in international
markets.
The second key provision of the Amato-Carli law provides
tax incentives for a two-year period. These tax incentives, as
well as the new legal structure of banks, will provide a stimulus
toward consolidation in the banking industry, increasing the size
of banks, enhancing both geographical and functional synergies,
and placing them in a better position to face international
competition.
Finally, the Amato-Carli law provides for comprehensive
regulations of the banking groups, and defines the banking
groups permissible activities consistent with those approved at
the Community level. The law also foresees a consolidated su-
pervision, trying to balance the benefits of the group's synergies
with the necessity of limited firewalls.
Another feature of the Italian banking industry has long
been the absence of specific legislation separating banking and
6. For an overview of this legislation, see Carlo A. Ciampi, Governor of the Banca
d'Italia, Address at the'Annual Meeting of the Italian Bankers Association (July 19,
1991).
7. Law No. 218 (July 30, 1990), Gazz. Uff. (Aug. 8, 1990).
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commerce.' The prevention of the mix, that is potentially dan-
gerous for reasons of conflicts of interest and concentration of
power has long been based on the moral persuasion of the cen-
tral bank. A resolution adopted by the Interministerial Commit-
tee on Credit and Savings" in March 1987 strengthened the
Banca d'Italia's administrative powers to maintain this separa-
tion for newly created depository institutions. More recently, the
antitrust law of October 1990,10 which is aimed at stimulating
the level of competition in the economy, has established a disci-
pline that is very relevant to banks, since it firmly introduces
the general principle of separateness between banking and com-
merce, setting a fifteen percent ceiling on the equity interest of
nonfinancial companies in commercial banks.
The securities investment business law of January 199111 is
part of the already mentioned effort to stress the importance of
the capital market. The law creates a type of financial interme-
diary, securities investment firm (SIM), eligible to engage in a
full range of securities activities: as underwriter, broker, dealer,
and money manager. Supervisory responsibility is shared be-
tween the Banca d'Italia and the Italian equivalent to the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, the CONSOB depending on the
purpose of supervision. Banca d'Italia is charged with controls
aimed at stability, such as capital and liquidity ratios or Chinese
walls between different activities, while the CONSOB has pow-
ers to ensure orderly trading and the protection of customers.
The law also provides some rules for the capital market organi-
zation, making it mandatory, for listed securities, to concentrate
trading in the stock exchange, and envisaging the adoption of
telematic technology. Greater competition will result from the
substantial deregulation of the broker's fees. The regulations is-
sued by the Banca d'Italia and the CONSOB, and the recent.
enactment of an insider trading law2 complete the framework of
this legislation.
Once again, this legislation can be best understood given the
historical background that was characterized by a number of in-
8. In the sense of commercial ownership or control of banks.
9. A committee chaired by the Treasury Minister and made up of some Ministers
and the Governor of the Banca d'Italia. The Committee sets financial and banking policy
guidelines.
10. Law No. 287 (Oct, 10, 1990). Gazz. Uff. (Oct. 13, 1990).
11. Law No. 1 (Jan. 2, 1991), Gazz. Uff. (Apr. 1, 1991).
12. Law No. 157 (May 17, 1991), Gazz. Uff. (May. 20, 1991).
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termediaries, as "agenti di cambio" and "commissionarie," with
outdated and inadequate regulations. The protection of custom-
ers was less effective since, in the absence of specific regulations
for capital markets, customers could only rely on the general
rules of the civil code. Trading outside the official exchanges was
also widespread: only thirty percent occurred at the exchanges.
The stability controls entrusted to the Banca d'Italia are
consistent with the principle that the financial markets are in
fact one market (a principle well assessed in the Brady Report of
1988), so that only one agency should have the ultimate supervi-
sory responsibility over them.
The Italian authorities would have preferred to create the
European Central Bank at the outset of the second, transitional
stage in 1994 but recently another view prevailed and, in 1994, a
European Monetary Institution will instead be created, to be
then eliminated at the final stage. The European Monetary In-
stitution, however, will have the same duties as a Federal Cen-
tral Bank in a transitional phase: to gradually prepare the single
monetary policy, which will replace national monetary policies. 13
On the issue of the economic convergence, the task facing
Italy is both difficult and important given the dimensions of the
economy and the imbalance of the public accounts. Programs of
adjustment are being activated in agreement with the Commu-
nity institutions. Italian authorities share the view that some ec-
onomic indicators of economic convergence must be adopted,
but believe at the same time that none of them can be taken
alone. In addition, the economic indicators' trend should be
more relevant than their static value in areas such as, for exam-
ple, government deficits. We also think that any decision about
dates and methods of implementation for the final stage of the
union must be taken all together, and not by a select number of
member countries.
There is no question that with the process of closer integra-
tion underway, new and demanding challenges will continue to
face the Community countries in general, including Italy.
13. See Carlo A. Ciampi, L'impegno dell'Italia per l'Europa, Paper for the Confer-
ence on Monetary Policy and Italian Integration in the EEC held at University of Fer-
rara (Sept. 27, 1991), at 17-18.
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